Time is not money by Ellingsen, Tore & Johannesson, Magnus
www.ssoar.info
Time is not money
Ellingsen, Tore; Johannesson, Magnus
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Ellingsen, T., & Johannesson, M. (2009). Time is not money. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 72(1),
96-102. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.05.010
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-293876
Accepted Manuscript
Title: Time Is Not Money
Authors: Tore Ellingsen, Magnus Johannesson
PII: S0167-2681(09)00147-4
DOI: doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.05.010
Reference: JEBO 2398
To appear in: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Received date: 7-12-2006
Revised date: 7-5-2009
Accepted date: 8-5-2009
Please cite this article as: Ellingsen, T., Johannesson, M., Time Is Not Money, Journal
of Economic Behavior and Organization (2008), doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.05.010
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication.
As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript.
The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof
before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process
errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that
apply to the journal pertain.
Page 1 of 31
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Time Is Not Money
Tore Ellingsen∗
Stockholm School of Economics
Magnus Johannesson∗∗
Stockholm School of Economics
May 7, 2009
Abstract
In an ultimatum bargaining experiment, we study how subjects bar-
gain over the returns to their investments of money and time. The
most notable ﬁnding is that a third of the subjects demand no compen-
sation for their time investments, whereas almost all subjects demand
compensation for equally costly monetary investments.
JEL classification: C91, J20, L14, Z13.
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1 Introduction
Human capital theory, as developed by Becker (1964,1965) and others, has
been tremendously successful at explaining many features of social interac-
tion. However, by focussing on the exchange of labor services for money,
and assuming convertibility between the two, human capital theory takes
for granted Benjamin Franklin’s dictum that “time is money.” By contrast,
anthropologists have long insisted that the convertibility between time and
money is circumscribed by norms and values. Many societies place tight re-
strictions on exchange, several of the most striking examples being recounted
by Bohannan (1963, Part 4).1 However, since many of the anthropologists’
favorite examples concern “exotic” cultures, their impact on mainstream eco-
nomic thinking has been modest. In this paper, we provide experimental
evidence that Swedish students also reason somewhat diﬀerently about their
time than about their money.
Our experiment runs as follows. One party, let us call her the proposer,
can make an investment that yields a potential monetary gain from trade
with another party, let us call him the responder. Some proposers can make
a monetary investment, others invest time. Upon investment, the proposer
makes a bargaining proposal concerning how to split the monetary gain.
The responder, whose gain from trade is known, either accepts or rejects the
proposal. The primary question is whether the proposal is diﬀerent under
time investment than under monetary investment.
For the comparison to be valid, costs and beneﬁts must be as similar as
possible across the two treatments. Since the opportunity cost of a proposers’
time is not observed by the responder, the opportunity cost of monetary in-
vestments should also not be observed by responders – preferably, the two
investment cost distributions should be identical. To achieve comparabil-
ity, we elicit a distribution of time costs from a separate group of subjects,
with the same characteristics. In the monetary treatment, both proposers
and responders know that the investment costs are drawn from the elicited
distribution, but only proposers learn the realization. Using the elicited dis-
tribution of investment costs, it is straightforward to keep the two treatments
comparable. In the non-monetary treatment, the investment is to perform a
task for 20 minutes. In the monetary treatment, the monetary investment
1The notion that peoples’ behavior is “domain-speciﬁc” is quite common in other social
sciences. See for example Waltzer (1983) and Tetlock et al. (2000). For a sociological
discussion of the meaning of money along similar lines, see Zelitzer (1994).
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cost is drawn from an elicited distribution of time costs. The proposer’s
investment always generates a potential gain from trade of SEK 100.
If agents are selﬁsh, theory predicts that proposers should always invest
and make a proposal of SEK 99 (as long as the investment cost is below SEK
100). However, a large body of work in experimental economics suggests
that a substantial fraction of individuals have strong preferences for fairness
in bargaining situations, and that proposers often propose an equal split (see
Camerer (2003) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) for overviews). It has also
been shown that, with monetary investment costs, subjects often propose an
equal split of the net surplus. That is, they split evenly the surplus remaining
after compensating proposers for the sunk investment cost (Ellingsen and
Johannesson 2004a, 2005a).2 With a non-zero investment cost even proposers
that care strongly about fairness are therefore predicted to make proposal
above SEK 50.
All the models referred to above as well as the various recent models
of social preferences and reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002) predict that behavior
should be independent of whether the proposer invests time or money.
Contrary to this prediction, we ﬁnd that behavior diﬀers markedly be-
tween the two experimental treatments. In the monetary treatment almost
all proposers claim more than half the gross gain from trade. In the non–
monetary treatment, about a third of the proposers divide the gross gain
from trade equally, despite having incurred a positive investment cost.
2 Experiment
Our subjects were recently enrolled undergraduate business and economics
students at the Stockholm School of Economics. They were paid a partici-
pation fee of SEK 100, and they could earn between SEK 0 and SEK 100 in
the experiment (SEK is Swedish Kronor; SEK 10 was approximately USD
1 at the time of the experiment). A total of 276 subjects participated in
the experiment (i.e. 138 bargaining pairs). Five sessions were carried out
with between 26 and 29 bargaining pairs in each session (one session with
2Ellingsen and Johannesson 2005b conducted a similar study with a non-monetary
investment cost. However, the monetary equivalent of the investment cost was elicited
without giving incentives for truthful reporting, and the paper did not consider a compar-
ison between monetary and non–monetary investments.
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Treatment I and two sessions each with Treatment II and Treatment III).
Each subject participated in one treatment only. The three experimental
treatments, referred to as the “control group”, the “time investment group”,
and the “money investment group” in the text, are described in more detail
below. The full instructions are available as an online appendix.
An important problem in experimental work is that the framing of the
experiment matters. If the frame strongly suggests that the experiment is
concerned with gift giving, that by itself can trigger gift giving behavior.
Since we wanted to focus on generous behavior in situations where generosity
is not obviously called for, we framed the experiment as a bargaining problem.
In the experiment two individuals, form a pair. In our instructions, the
individuals are referred to neutrally as individuals A and B, but for conve-
nience we shall here call them respectively proposers and responders. Pro-
posers and responders are located in diﬀerent rooms, room A and room B,
and pairing is anonymous and random. The proposer ﬁrst decides whether
to carry out an investment or not. If the investment is carried out a SEK
100 potential gain from trade is created for the pair, and the proposer and
the responder bargain over how to divide the SEK 100 between them in an
ultimatum game. The proposer suggests a division and the responder accepts
or rejects this division. If the proposal is accepted the SEK 100 is divided
according to the proposal, and if the proposal is rejected both get nothing.
To compare monetary and non–monetary investment costs, we implement
three experimental treatments that vary with respect to the investment cost.
In the ﬁrst (“control”) treatment the investment cost is zero, which imply
that subjects essentially play the standard ultimatum game. In the second
(“time”) treatment the investment is for the proposer to stay for 20 minutes
after the end of the experiment. The investment cost in the third (“mone-
tary”) treatment consists of a monetary cost that is equivalent to the cost of
staying 20 minutes after the end of the experiment. Because the time cost of
20 minutes will vary between proposers, and the cost is private information
to the proposer, we separately elicit a distribution for the time cost and ran-
domly draw a monetary cost from this distribution for each proposer in the
third treatment. The monetary investment cost is private information to the
proposer, and the responder only knows the procedure for determining it.
The distribution of time costs is elicited from the subjects in the control
treatment after they have completed the ultimatum game, using the Becker-
DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism (Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak,
1964). That is, each subject is asked to state a reservation price for staying
4
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20 minutes. Then a random number x is drawn. If the subject’s reservation
price is below x, the subject is paid x and must stay. Otherwise, the subject
leaves.
We now describe the three treatments in more detail.
2.1 Treatment I: Costless investment (control)
In each of the two rooms subjects are given a number between 1 and N, where
N is the number of students in the room. Subjects with identical numbers
form a pair. Matching is random, and anonymity is maintained throughout.
The subjects are given the instructions and are asked to read them. Subjects
are allowed to ask clarifying questions to the experimenter, but not publicly.
At the beginning of the instructions the subjects are told whether they are
in room A or room B.
After the subjects have read the instructions the subject in room A (the
proposer) decides whether he/she will carry out an investment or not, at a
zero investment cost. If the investment is carried out, a SEK 100 revenue is
created for the pair, and the proposer proposes how to split it. If the subject
in room B (the responder) accepts the proposal, both individuals are paid
according to the proposal. If the responder rejects the proposal, both get
nothing, except their participation fees.
2.2 Treatment II: Time investment
Treatment II is identical to Treatment I with the exception that the invest-
ment for the proposer now consists of staying for 20 minutes after the end
of the experiment. After the subjects have been paid, all responders leave.
The proposers that decided not to invest also leave at this point. After 20
minutes the investors leave.
2.3 Treatment III: Money investment
Treatment III is identical to Treatment II with the exception that the in-
vestment is now monetary. All subjects are told that the investment cost
varies between the proposers and that the size of the investment cost is com-
municated only to the respective proposer. All subjects are also given the
following information about how the investment cost has been determined:
“In a separate group in the experiment 50 individuals have valued their cost
5
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of staying after the end of the experiment for 20 minutes. The valuation
was done in a way so that every person had an incentive to reveal his/her
true cost. For every person in room A we have randomly chosen the cost of
giving up 20 minutes for one of these 50 individuals and used this cost as the
investment cost.”
Two remarks are in order. First, we know from Ellingsen and Johannesson
(2005a) that responders’ expectations about proposers’ sunk costs matter for
responders’ behavior. If we would not have explained how the investment cost
distribution is generated, there is thus little reason to assume that responders
in the money treatment would behave as in the time treatment. Second, note
that a proposer still has to undertake the investment in case the bargaining
proposal is rejected. Thus, it is possible for a proposer to leave the experiment
with less than the SEK 100 participation fee. We correctly anticipated that
there would be no instances in which the time cost exceeded SEK 100 and
the proposer invested. Hence, we never had to ask subjects to pay out of
their own pocket.
2.4 Eliciting time costs
The subjects that participated in Treatment I also valued the cost of staying
for 20 minutes. Before the experiment started they were told that they
would participate in two experiments. When they had completed the ﬁrst
experiment, Treatment I, they were given the instructions for the second
experiment, valuing the cost of 20 minutes. We used this procedure because
we wanted the valuation of the time cost to resemble as closely as possible
the situation in the time investment group (Treatment II).
The BDM mechanism, developed by Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak
(1964), provides incentives for subjects to truthfully reveal the value they
assign to a private good, in this case 20 minutes of the subjects’ time. Each
subject states his/her minimum compensation (price) for staying 20 minutes
after the end of the experiment (and they are told that they will complete a
questionnaire during these 20 minutes to pass the time). We draw a buying
price randomly from a uniform distribution between SEK 0 and SEK 100
(with SEK 5 increments). If the buying price exceeds or equals the reser-
vation price, the subject receives the buying price and stays for 20 minutes.
If the buying price is below the reservation price the subject leaves. As in
previous applications of the BDM mechanism (e.g. Grether and Plott 1979;
Bohm, Linde´n, and Sonneg˚ard 1997) the subjects were informed about the
6
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incentive compatibility properties of the BDM mechanism. As recommended
by Bohm, Linde´n, and Sonneg˚ard (1997), we did not communicate the up-
per bound of the buying price. Instead, we told the subjects that the upper
bound is set at a level corresponding to the maximum reasonable valuation
of the cost of giving up 20 minutes.3
2.5 Hypotheses and tests
Our null hypothesis is that bargaining behavior is the same in the three
treatments. Because bargaining experiments usually lead to skewed dis-
tributions, we employ bootstrapped standard errors when comparing mean
proposals across treatments.4 The signiﬁcance levels for the comparisons of
proposals have all been obtained by generating 2,099 bootstrap replications.
To compare proportions (e.g., the proportion of investors and the propor-
tion of accepted proposals) between treatments, we use a contingency table
Pearson chi-square test (D’Agostino, Chase, and Belanger 1988). All re-
ported p-values are two-sided. Finally, we use logistic regression analysis to
test whether the responders’ acceptance probability diﬀers across treatments,
controlling for the bargaining proposal.
3 Results
Figure 1 displays the distribution of elicited time costs. The time cost varies
between SEK 0 and SEK 100 for the 56 subjects.5 The mean value is SEK
28 and the median value is SEK 25, which is also the most common time cost
– about 20% of the subjects had a time cost of SEK 25. The distribution
of time costs in Treatment III is virtually identical to that in Figure 1.6
3Incidentally, our upper bound turned out to coincide exactly with the highest reported
valuation.
4See e.g. Efron and Tibshirani (1993) and Davidson and MacKinnon (1999). As we
shall see, our sample is large enough to bring the resulting p–values fairly close to the
p–values associated with the t–test, whereas the distance to non–parametric test statistics
is large (due to skewness); see footnote ??.
5All time costs except two were given in even SEK 5 increments. The two time costs
that were not in even SEK 5 increments (SEK 39 and SEK 49) are included in the closest
categories in Figure 1.
6All the estimated time costs in Figure 1 is used except one estimate, because the
number of estimates (n=56) is one more than the bargaining pairs (n=55). The (randomly
7
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Observe that the compensation i the experiment is tax free. For comparison,
the average hourly earnings of wage earners in wholesale and retail trade
(which is the kind of job that many students will hold part–time) was roughly
SEK 104 before tax.7 The twenty minute equivalent is SEK 34.7 before tax,
corresponding to about SEK 24.3 after deducting the relevant marginal tax
of thirty percent. The elicited values are thus well in line with the wage
measure of the opportunity cost of time.
****INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE****
3.1 Proposer behavior
Table 1 reports the “average” behavior of proposers and responders as well as
the share of proposals weakly below 50 and weakly above 80.8 Proposers in
the money investment group on average make proposals that are about SEK
5 higher than the proposals in the time investment group (p=0.056), and
SEK 9 higher than the proposals in the control group (p=0.001). Although
the average proposal is somewhat higher in the time investment group than
in the control group, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence
(p = 0.213).
********INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE**********
There is also a tendency that fewer proposers are willing to make mone-
tary investments. In the time investment group only one proposer abstained
from making the investment, whereas four proposers abstained from making
the investment in the money investment group. Again the diﬀerence is not
statistically signiﬁcant (p = 0.170). As might be expected, the four proposers
that abstain from investing have relatively high investment costs (SEK 100,
SEK 70, SEK 50 and SEK 25). This is consistent with Ellingsen and Johan-
nesson (2005a), who showed that asymmetric information about investment
costs reduces investment compared to various complete information bench-
marks.
chosen) estimate that is not used is SEK 80.
7Table 340, Statistical Yearbook of Sweden 2004, the columns for year 2002 (when the
experiment was conducted).
8As explained above, we use bootstrapped standard errors when making comparisons
across treatments. If we instead use a Mann–Whitney test to compare average proposals,
the corresponding p–values are 0.102, < 0.001, and 0.212 (instead of 0.213, 0.001, and
0.056). The diﬀerence is that the Mann-Whitney test only uses ordinal information. An
independent samples t–test yields p–values closer to the bootstrapped values, namely 0.236,
0.003, and 0.063.
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There is a tendency for proposers with higher investment costs to demand
a larger share of the SEK 100. An increase in the investment cost by SEK
1 in the money investment group on average increases the proposal by SEK
0.16 (p = 0.096).9
Figure 2 displays the distribution of proposals in the control group (the
ultimatum game).10 The most common proposals are SEK 50 and SEK 60,
which is well in line with other studies; see Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and
Camerer (2003, Chapter 2).
*************INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE****************
Figure 3 compares the distribution of proposals between the money and
time investment groups.11
************INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE*****************
Comparing behavior in the time treatment to that in the money treat-
ment using a Two-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we ﬁnd that the two
distributions are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (p = 0.038). The most striking diﬀer-
ence is the proportion of 50/50 proposals. The proportion of equal splits of
the gross surplus is 30% in the time investment group, but only 6% in the
money investment group. This diﬀerence is highly signiﬁcant (p = 0.002).
Interestingly, two subjects in the time investment group propose SEK 0, i.e.
they give away all the gains from trade. At the same time, there appears to
be a countervailing tendency towards high proposals in the time investment
group. The fraction of proposals at SEK 80 or above is 28% in the time in-
vestment group and 18% in the money investment group, but the diﬀerence
is not statistically signiﬁcant (p = 0.217).
To the extent that subjects in the money investment group opt for an
equal split, they do so after accounting for their investment cost. More
precisely, 18% of the subjects split the net surplus exactly equally, 29% are
within SEK 2.5 of an equal split (the relevant comparison when subjects
round their oﬀers to the nearest SEK 5), and 41% are within SEK 5 of
9In Ellingsen and Johannesson (2005a) 75% of proposers had zero investment cost and
25% had an investment cost of SEK 60. Despite this diﬀerence in the investment cost
distribution, the relationship between the size of the investment cost and the bargaining
proposal is quite similar across the two studies. There, an increase in the investment cost
by SEK 1 in the money investment group on average increased the proposal by SEK 0.12.
10For convenience one proposal of SEK 49 is included in the SEK 50 category in Figure
2. A proposal of 30 is not shown in the ﬁgure, but is included in the analysis.
11One proposer in the monetary cost group made a proposal of SEK 63.5 and one
proposer made a proposal of SEK 79. In Figure 3, these proposals are included in the
SEK 65 and SEK 80 categories respectively. (All other proposals were divisible by 5.)
9
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an equal split (the relevant comparison when subjects round their oﬀers to
the nearest SEK 10). These numbers are in the same ballpark as those in
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2005a).
We may also compare the distribution of proposals between the time
investment group and the control group. The fraction of proposals of SEK 50
is almost identical in these two groups (about 30% in each group). However,
the fraction of high proposals is higher in the time investment group. The
fraction of proposals at or above SEK 80 is 28% in the time investment group
versus 7% in the control group (p = 0.029). It seems as if the proposers in
the time investment group can roughly be divided into two categories. One
category ignores the time cost when they make the bargaining proposal; the
other category acts as if investment is monetary. The group that ignores
the time cost is the same size as the group that propose an even split in the
standard ultimatum game. It seems reasonable to guess that people who are
fairminded in the ultimatum game are also generous with their time, but the
only way to determine the overlap between the two groups is to have subjects
participate in multiple treatments.
3.2 Responder behavior
The responders’ average acceptance rate is about 90% in all three treatments
(see Table 1). In Table 2 we report the results of a logistic regression testing
whether the acceptance probability diﬀers across treatments when we control
for the proposal.
***************INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE*****************
For a given proposal, responders are somewhat more likely to accept the
proposal if there has been a prior investment. The diﬀerence in acceptance
probability is statistically signiﬁcant at the ten percent level in our two–
sided test (and at the ﬁve percent level in a one–sided test, which is arguably
more appropriate in this case), even if we do not pool the time and money
treatment data. This ﬁnding is well in line with previous ﬁndings that re-
sponders consider the proposer’s sunk costs to be relevant, even when these
costs cannot be observed directly (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2005a).
As expected, the acceptance probability decreases for higher proposals,
and this eﬀect is strongly signiﬁcant (p < 0.001). The acceptance probability
at a speciﬁc proposal is also signiﬁcantly higher in the time investment group
(p = 0.068) and the money investment group (p = 0.095) compared to the
control group. The diﬀerence between the time investment group and the
10
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money investment group is small and not statistically signiﬁcant (p = 0.710).
We thus ﬁnd no evidence that responder behavior diﬀers between the money
and time investment treatments.12
Looking at the raw data, there are no rejection of proposals below 70
in any of the treatments. It thus seems unlikely that all the subjects who
propose 50 in the time treatment does so because they are afraid that more
selﬁsh proposals, such as 60, would be rejected.
4 Final remarks
Our most notable ﬁnding is that a sizeable fraction of proposers require no
compensation for their time investment, whereas almost all proposers require
compensation for monetary investment. Our preferred explanation is that
subjects are generally more prone to make non–monetary sacriﬁces than to
make equivalent monetary sacriﬁces. Indeed, any alternative explanation
would seem to involve some bias in our time cost elicitation procedure.
A natural avenue for further research is to identify the source of the
money–time asymmetry. One possibility is that people have a greater ten-
dency to behave generously in the time domain than in the money domain.
Since proposals below 70 are never rejected in our data, it seems unlikely
that a substantial fraction of the 50:50 splits are due to fears that greedier
proposals will be rejected. A survey of donor attitudes by Lee, Piliavin, and
Call (1999) supports the notion of domain–speciﬁc generosity. It ﬁnds that
volunteering of time is more strongly aﬀected by others’ expectations than
are gifts of blood and money. The authors speculate that the greater visibil-
ity of time donations make people behave more prosocially on this domain.13
If one would replicate the money–time asymmetry of our ultimatum bar-
gaining experiment in an otherwise identical dictator game experiment, the
case for the domain–speciﬁc generosity interpretation would be strengthened
considerably.
Another explanation for our ﬁndings, suggested by an anonymous referee,
is that subjects engage in mental accounting (Thaler, 1980, 1999) – account-
12As we only observe an accept/reject decision of each responder, the statistical power
to detect diﬀerences in responder behavior is also limited.
13There is a signiﬁcant economic literature on the non–monetary nature of gifts. See for
example Camerer (1988), Waldfogel (1993), Prendergast and Stole (2001), Ellingsen and
Johannesson (2004b).
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ing for monetary costs, but not time costs, when money is being divided. It
seems feasible to conduct experiments that would discriminate between the
two hypotheses, and we hope to see such experiments in the future.
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Figure 1: Valuations of time (SEK for 20 minutes)
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Figure 2: Proposals in the ultimatum game (control).
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Figure 3: Distribution of proposals in the two main treatments.
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Treatment p–value of diﬀerence
Control Time Money 1 vs 2 1 vs 3 2 vs 3
Number of pairs 28 55 55
Proportion investors 1.00 0.98 0.93 0.473 0.144 0.170
Average proposal 59.43 63.24 68.34 0.213 0.001 0.056
Share of proposals = 50 0.32 0.30 0.06 0.815 0.002 0.002
Share of proposals ≥ 80 0.07 0.28 0.18 0.029 0.197 0.217
Acceptance rate 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.957 0.898 0.827
Table 1: Aggregate results
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Variable* Coeﬃcient p–value Marginal eﬀect
Constant 19.695 < 0.001
Proposal -0.260 < 0.001 0.0030
Time investment dummy 2.040 0.068 0.024
Money investment dummy 1.752 0.095 0.020
Number of pairs 133
χ2 34.72
Log–likelihood -27.39
McFadden pseudo R2 0.39
Individual prediction (%) 91.73
*Baseline category is costless investment (control).
Table 2: Logistic regression of acceptance probability.
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APPENDIX 1: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
The original instructions were in Swedish. This appendix reprints a translation of the instructions used in the 
three experimental treatments (the control group, the time investment group, and the money investment group). 
The instructions for the estimation of the time cost with the BDM mechanism are also reprinted below. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS (The control group)                                               
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment. As a compensation for participating you (and the other 
participants in the experiment) will receive SEK 100. This compensation of SEK 100 plus the profit you make 
during the experiment will be paid towards the end of the experiment. In the experiment each of you will be 
paired with a trading partner who is in another room. Neither of you will be told who the trading partner is 
either during or after the experiment. There is the same number of persons in each room (A and B). This is 
room A (B). Every person in room A and B has been given these instructions and a number that shows which 
pair he/she belong to. The experiment consists of two stages.     
 
At stage 1 every person in room A has to decide whether to carry out a costless investment or not. If the person 
in room A decides to make the investment revenue of SEK 100 is created for the pair that the person belongs to, 
and the person in room A makes a proposal for how to divide the revenue of SEK 100 between himself and the 
trading partner in room B.  
 
In stage 2 the trading partner in room B can accept or reject this proposal. The negotiation has two possible 
outcomes: 
 
(i) The person in room B accepts the proposed division. The SEK 100 are then divided according to the 
proposal.  
  
(ii) The person in room B rejects the proposed division. Each person then receives nothing.       
 
The experiment is carried out in the following way. At stage 1 every person in room A decides whether to carry 
out the investment or not. This is done by choosing “yes” or “no” on the form marked ”Investment decision” 
(that has been given to all persons in room A). Persons in room A that have chosen to make the investment also 
write down their proposed divisions of the revenue on the same form. In stage 2 the forms are collected and 
handed out to each trading partner in room B. For the pairs where investment was chosen the trading partner 
accepts or rejects the proposed division by marking the respective ”Accept” or ”Reject” box. The forms are 
then collected again and handed out to the persons in room A.    
 
In the protocol on page 2 of these instructions both persons record the outcome of the experiment; i.e. the 
investment decision, the proposed division, if the proposed division was accepted or not, and their profit from 
the experiment (that is given by the proposed division if the proposal was accepted; if the proposal was rejected 
the profit is SEK 0). For persons in pairs where no investment was made, the profit from the experiment is SEK 
0. Every person then receives his or her profit from the experiment plus the SEK 100 participation fee.  
 
Tables and instructions (online appendix)
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PROTOCOL  
 
 
 
The person in room A chose to make the investment:       
 
yes…..       
no…..       
 
 
If the person in room A chose not to make the investment, your profit of the experiment is SEK 0 and the 
negotiation is cancelled. The remainder of the protocol should only be filled in if you belong to a pair where the 
person in room A chose to make the investment.      
 
 
Proposed division from the person in room A of the revenue of SEK 100:  
The person in room A receives…………….SEK 
The person in room B receives…………….SEK 
 
The proposal was accepted by the person in room B: yes……   no…….. 
 
Your profit from the experiment……………..SEK* 
(If the proposed division was rejected your profit from the experiment is SEK 0. If the proposed division was 
accepted your profit from the experiment is equal to the proposed division.) 
 
* Note that each person that participates in the experiment in both room A and room B apart from the profit of 
the experiment will also receive a compensation of SEK 100 for participating in the experiment. 
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 3
INSTRUCTIONS (The time investment group)                                               
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment. As a compensation for participating you (and the other 
participants in the experiment) will receive SEK 100. This compensation of SEK 100 plus the profit you make 
during the experiment will be paid towards the end of the experiment. In the experiment each of you will be 
paired with a trading partner who is in another room. Neither of you will be told who the trading partner is 
either during or after the experiment. There is the same number of persons in each room (A and B). This is 
room A (B). Every person in room A and B has been given these instructions and a number that shows which 
pair he/she belong to. The experiment consists of two stages.     
 
At stage 1 every person in room A has to decide whether to carry out an investment or not (the investment cost, 
that is paid by the person in room A, is described below). If the person in room A decides to make the 
investment revenue of SEK 100 is created for the pair that the person belongs to, and the person in room A 
makes a proposal for how to divide the revenue of SEK 100 between himself and the trading partner in room B.  
 
In stage 2 the trading partner in room B can accept or reject this proposal. The negotiation has two possible 
outcomes: 
 
(i) The person in room B accepts the proposed division. The SEK 100 are then divided according to the 
proposal.  
  
(ii) The person in room B rejects the proposed division. Each person then receives nothing.       
 
The investment cost is that the person in room A stays after the end of the experiment for 20 minutes. To fill 
out the time during these 20 minutes each person in room A that carry out the investment will be given a 
questionnaire to complete. (Observe that it is only the person in room A that can make the investment and 
who pays the entire investment cost. The trading partner in room B always leaves directly after the end 
of the experiment.) 
 
The experiment is carried out in the following way. At stage 1 every person in room A decides whether to carry 
out the investment or not, i.e. if he/she will stay for 20 minutes after the end of the experiment. This is done by 
choosing “yes” or “no” on the form marked ”Investment decision” (that has been given to all persons in room 
A). Persons in room A that have chosen to make the investment also write down their proposed divisions of the 
revenue on the same form. In stage 2 the forms are collected and handed out to each trading partner in room B. 
For the pairs where investment was chosen the trading partner accepts or rejects the proposed division by 
marking the respective ”Accept” or ”Reject” box. The forms are then collected again and handed out to the 
persons in room A.    
 
In the protocol on page 2 of these instructions both persons record the outcome of the experiment; i.e. the 
investment decision, the proposed division, if the proposed division was accepted or not, and their profit from 
the experiment (that is given by the proposed division if the proposal was accepted; if the proposal was rejected 
the profit is SEK 0). For persons in pairs where no investment was made, the profit from the experiment is SEK 
0. Every person then receives his or her profit from the experiment plus the SEK 100 participation fee. 
Thereafter all participants can leave, except the persons in room A that chose to make the investment. These 
persons stay for 20 minutes (irrespectively of if their proposed division was accepted or not). 
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 4
PROTOCOL  
 
 
 
The person in room A chose to make the investment:       
 
yes…..       
no…..       
 
 
If the person in room A chose not to make the investment, your profit of the experiment is SEK 0 and the 
negotiation is cancelled. The remainder of the protocol should only be filled in if you belong to a pair where the 
person in room A chose to make the investment.      
 
 
Proposed division from the person in room A of the revenue of SEK 100:  
The person in room A receives…………….SEK 
The person in room B receives…………….SEK 
 
The proposal was accepted by the person in room B: yes……   no…….. 
 
Your profit from the experiment……………..SEK* 
(If the proposed division was rejected your profit from the experiment is SEK 0. If the proposed division was 
accepted your profit from the experiment is equal to the proposed division.) 
 
* Note that each person that participates in the experiment in both room A and room B apart from the profit of 
the experiment will also receive a compensation of SEK 100 for participating in the experiment. 
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INSTRUCTIONS (The money investment group)                                               
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment. As a compensation for participating you (and the other 
participants in the experiment) will receive SEK 100. This compensation of SEK 100 plus/minus the profit/loss 
you make during the experiment will be paid towards the end of the experiment. In the experiment each of you 
will be paired with a trading partner who is in another room. Neither of you will be told who the trading partner 
is either during or after the experiment. There is the same number of persons in each room (A and B). This is 
room A (B). Every person in room A and B has been given these instructions and a number that shows which 
pair he/she belong to. The experiment consists of two stages.     
 
At stage 1 every person in room A has to decide whether to carry out an investment or not (the investment cost, 
that is paid by the person in room A, is described below). If the person in room A decides to make the 
investment revenue of SEK 100 is created for the pair that the person belongs to, and the person in room A 
makes a proposal for how to divide the revenue of SEK 100 between himself and the trading partner in room B.  
 
In stage 2 the trading partner in room B can accept or reject this proposal. The negotiation has two possible 
outcomes: 
 
(i) The person in room B accepts the proposed division. The SEK 100 are then divided according to the 
proposal.  
  
(ii) The person in room B rejects the proposed division. Each person then receives nothing.       
 
The investment cost varies between different persons in room A and is given on the form marked “Investment 
cost” (that has been given to all persons in room A). (Observe that it is only the person in room A that can 
make the investment and who pays the entire investment cost.) The exact size of the investment cost is not 
revealed to the person in room B. The investment cost for each person in room A has been determined in the 
following manner. In a separate group in the experiment 50 individuals have valued their cost of staying after 
the end of the experiment for 20 minutes (and they were informed that they would complete a questionnaire 
during these 20 minutes to pass the time). The valuation was done in a way so that every person had an 
incentive to reveal his/her true cost. For every person in room A we have randomly chosen the cost of giving up 
20 minutes for one of these 50 individuals and used this cost as the investment cost. 
 
The experiment is carried out in the following way. At stage 1 every person in room A decides whether to carry 
out the investment or not. This is done by choosing “yes” or “no” on the form marked ”Investment decision” 
(that has been given to all persons in room A). Persons in room A that have chosen to make the investment also 
write down their proposed divisions of the revenue on the same form. In stage 2 the forms are collected and 
handed out to each trading partner in room B. For the pairs where investment was chosen the trading partner 
accepts or rejects the proposed division by marking the respective ”Accept” or ”Reject” box. The forms are 
then collected again and handed out to the persons in room A.    
 
In the protocol on page 2 of these instructions both persons record the outcome of the experiment; i.e. the 
investment decision, the proposed division, if the proposed division was accepted or not, and their revenue 
from the negotiation (that is given by the proposed division if the proposal was accepted; if the proposal was 
rejected the revenue is SEK 0). Finally each person calculates their profit from the experiment and writes it 
down on the protocol. For persons in room A the profit is equal to the revenue of the negotiation minus the 
investment cost. For persons in room B the profit of the experiment is equal to the revenue of the negotiation. 
For persons in pairs where no investment was made, the profit from the experiment is SEK 0. Every person 
then receives his or her profit from the experiment plus the SEK 100 participation fee. Thereafter all 
participants can leave. 
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PROTOCOL  
 
 
 
The person in room A chose to make the investment:       
 
yes…..       
no…..       
 
 
If the person in room A chose not to make the investment, your profit of the experiment is SEK 0 and the 
negotiation is cancelled. The remainder of the protocol should only be filled in if you belong to a pair where the 
person in room A chose to make the investment.      
 
 
Proposed division from the person in room A of the revenue of SEK 100:  
The person in room A receives…………….SEK 
The person in room B receives…………….SEK 
 
The proposal was accepted by the person in room B: yes……   no…….. 
 
Your revenue from the negotiation……………..SEK 
(If the proposed division was rejected your revenue from the negoti tion is SEK 0. If the proposed division was 
accepted your revenue from the negotiation is equal to the proposed division.) 
 
Your profit from the experiment……………….SEK* 
(If you are in room A your profit from the experiment is equal to your revenue from the negotiation minus the 
investment cost and if you are in room B your profit is equal to your revenue from the negotiation.) 
 
* Note that each person that participates in the experiment in both room A and room B apart from the profit of 
the experiment will also receive a compensation of SEK 100 for participating in the experiment. 
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 7
INSTRUCTIONS (Estimation of time cost with the BDM mechanism) 
 
In this part of the experiment we are interested in your (and the other participants) valuation of the cost of 
staying after the end of the experiment for 20 minutes. We will offer you a specific compensation to stay after 
the end of the experiment for 20 minutes (to pass the time during these 20 minutes you will be given a 
questionnaire to complete). 
 
On the enclosed form marked “Time cost” you will fill out the smallest compensation you accept to stay after 
the end of the experiment for 20 minutes. The forms are then collected. 
 
Thereafter we will draw the price that we are willing to pay for you to stay after the end of the experiment for 
20 minutes. The price is drawn randomly from a box that contain notes with prices from SEK 0 and upwards in 
SEK 5 increments: i.e. SEK 0, SEK 5, SEK 10, SEK 15, SEK 20, etc. upwards to the highest possible price. 
The highest possible price is equal to what we think is the highest possible reasonable valuation of the cost of 
giving up 20 minutes. In the random draw of the price one of you will draw a note with a price. After this draw 
you are welcome to inspect all the notes in the box.  
 
If the randomly drawn price (SEK X) is higher than or equal to the time cost you stated on the form we will pay 
you the drawn price (SEK X) and you will have to stay for 20 minutes. If the randomly drawn price (SEK X) is 
lower than the time cost you stated on the form, you can leave directly after the end of the experiment. 
 
Note that it is in your own best interest to state your time cost as accurately as possible, i.e. to be honest. This is 
because you cannot affect how much you get paid for staying for 20 minutes as this price is randomly drawn. 
The only thing you can affect is if you will stay for 20 minutes or not at different prices.   
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 8
TIME COST 
 
 
 
What is the smallest compensation you accept to stay after the end of the experiment for 20 minutes?  
 
………………….SEK 
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 9
APPENDIX 2: DATA TABLES 
 
 
Estimation of time cost (20 minutes) with the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism. 
n=56. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Time cost                           Number (%) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
0                                              1(2) 
5                                              4(7) 
10                                            4(7) 
15                                            6(11) 
20                                            9(16) 
25                                           10(18) 
30                                             7(12) 
39                                             1(2) 
40                                             5(9) 
49                                             1(2) 
50                                             5(9) 
70                                             1(2) 
80                                             1(2)  
100                                           1(2) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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 10
Bargaining behavior in the ultimatum game. Zero investment cost. n=28. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
            Proposed division           Number of pairs(%)     Number of accepted proposals       
        Investor   Trading partner        
_____________________________________________________________________                               
             30                 70                        1(4)                                 1 
49                 51                        1(4)                                  1 
             50                 50                       8(29)                                8                                   
             60                 40                       9(32)                                9                                       
             65                 35                       2(7)                                  2 
             70                 30                       4(14)                                4 
             75                 25                       1(4)                                  0 
             80                 20                       2(7)                                  0 
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Bargaining behavior in the ultimatum game. Time investment cost. n=54. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
            Proposed division           Number of pairs(%)     Number of accepted proposals       
        Investor   Trading partner        
_____________________________________________________________________                               
               0               100                       2(4)                               2 
             50                 50                      16(30)                           16                                   
             60                 40                       8(15)                              8                                       
             65                 35                       2(4)                                2 
             70                 30                       8(15)                               7 
             75                 25                       3(6)                                 3 
 80                 20                      13(24)                             10 
 90                 10                        2(4)                                 0 
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 12
Bargaining behavior in the ultimatum game. Money investment cost. n=51. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
            Proposed division           Number of pairs(%)     Number of accepted proposals       
        Investor   Trading partner        
_____________________________________________________________________                                
 50                 50                        3(6)                               3   
             55                 45                        2(4)                               2 
             60                 40                       8(16)                             8                                       
             63.5              37.5                     1(2)                               1 
             65                 35                        8(16)                             8 
             69                 31                        2(4)                               2 
             70                 30                       10(20)                            9 
             75                 25                        8(16)                             7 
 79                 21                         1(2)                              0 
             80                 20                         7(14)                            5 
             85                 15                         1(2)                              1 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
